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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ARTHUR 0. NAUMAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

HAROLD K. BEECHER AND ASSOCIATES A Utah Corporation,
Defendant-AppeIIant.

Civil No.
11579

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries sustained
from a trench cave-in at the construction site of the
Metropolitan Hall of Justice in Salt Lake City, Utah.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Trial Court, sitting without a jury, granted
Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff against the corporate architect based on the architect's negligence
in failing to stop work on the trench until unsafe ·
conditions were remedied.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, Arthur Nauman, seeks to have the
Trial Court's judgment affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
· The Trial Court, as the determiner of facts, having heard the evidence and observed the demeanor
of the witnesses prepared detailed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law in support of its decision.
On appeal all the evidence and all reasonable inf,.
ences fairly to be drawn therefrom must be re
viewed most favorably to those findings.If there is
substantial evidence furnishing a reasonable basis
in support thereof the fudgment must be affirmed.
Rummell v. Bailey. 7 Utah 2d 137, 320 p. 2d 653 (1958);
Lake v. Penders. 13 Utah 2d 76, 368 P. 2d 593 (l 962);
John C. Cutler AsRociation v. D. J. Stores. 3 Utah 2d
107, 279, P. 2d 700 (1955). Since the Appellant Architect did not present its Statement of Facts in accordance with the above law, Respondent deems it
necessary to present the Statement of Facts in full.
The Appellant, Harold K. Beecher and Associates, in 1960 entered into separate but similar agreements with Salt Lake County and Salt Lake City to
provide professional architectural services in connection with the proposed construction of a CityCounty complex (T. 520, 521; Pl Ex. 1). Pursuant to
its contracts wiht the public bodies, the Architect
agreed to perform architect's professional services
consisting of the necessary conferences, the preparation of the working drawings, specifications, the
drafting of the contracts, and the general administra-
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3
tion of the construction project (Pl Ex. 1). The General Administration Section of the contract provided
in part that the Architect was to furnish at his own
expense u. qualified, on-site inspector during the entire time the constructon work was in progress,
whose duties were to consist of checking all. shop
drawings, to determine the quality and acceptance
o fthe material and'or equipment to be used, and to
supervise and inspect all phases of the work being
done. (Pl Ex. I-paragraph 7).

Thereafter the Architect in accordance with the
above agreements prepared the contract documents
for the construction of the Metropolitan Hall of
Justice (T. 5: Pl Ex. 2). Those contract documents
consisted of the general contract, the general conditions, the special conditions, the drawings and
specifications, the instruction to bidders, the notice
to creditors, the bid proposal, and the bond. All of
the above documents were part of the contract
which Salt Lake City, and Salt Lake County entered
into with Christiansen Brothers, Inc., the general
contractor (Pl Ex. 2).
The specifications were prepared into sections
with the general contract, the general conditions·,
and the special conditions being expressly made
applicable to each section of the specifications (P.
Ex. 2, paragraph 56-A qener.al conditions). The General Contractor under the contract documents was
required to perform in part as follows:
a) to promptly obey and follow every order
or direction given by the architect (paragraph
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3 of general contract);
b) to do the work in strict conformity to the
drawings, specifications and contract documents (paragraph 11 of general contract);
c) to close down the work and stop all operations upon wTitten notice from the architect
that conditions were dangerous (paragraph 12a
of general contract);
d) to maintain his work in a clean and safe
condition during the entire performance of the
contract (paragraph 15a general contract);
e) to take all necessary precutions for the
safety of the public employees on the work and
to comply with all applicable provisions of Federal, State and Municipal Safety Laws and
Building codes to prevent accidents or injury
to persons on the premises where the work is
being performed and to erect and maintain all
neceslOary safeguards for the protection of the
public and workmen (paragraph lb of the Special Conditions Section of the Contract);
f) to provide adequate sheet piling to safeguard life and property when eacth b:-.~"k-o 2: ~
to deep or are too steep (Section 2, page 2 of
the Specifications on Excavations).

The Construction Contract expressly provided
that the Architect, as the representative of both the
City apd County, was in charge of directing super·
vision. of c:onstrudion (Pl Ex. 2-paragraph 56-A.
General Conditions). The Architect, Harold K.
Beecher and Associates, had in part the following
rights and powers under the contract documents:
a) The architect was in charge of directing
supervision of construction (paragraph 56a of
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;;enrral conditions);
b) tht architect had the right to inspect and
reject all work and materials and the manufacture of such materials from the beginning of
construction until the final completion and acceptance of the work (paragraph 3 of general
contract);
c) the architect had the right to assign such
assistance ::lS necessary to inspect the materials
to be furnished and the work to be done under
the contract to see the same strictly conformed
to the specifications (paragraph 3a of the general contract):
d)

the architect had the right to give orders

to the Contractor, his superintendent, and Fore-

man, who were required to promptly obey and
follow (paragraph 3c of the general contract):
e) the architect had the right to close down
the work due to circumstances arising during
the pro~ress of the work which might be construed to be dangerous or that may be caused
by noncompliance with the specifications, upon
written notice and the work was to remain
closed down until further orders were given in
writing by said architect (paragraph 12a of
general contract) ;
the architect had the right to direct the
contractor to suspend, remove, or reconstruct,
or make good without chaq:;e any work which
the architect may consider to be· defectively
executed (paragraph 14 of general contract):
f)

That as part of this construction project it was
necessary to first excavate a trench approximately
900 feet long in order to install a utility tunnel con-
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necting the new boiler room to the old City-County
complex (T. 523, 771). The corporate architect hired
Johnathan H. Tucker as its qualified, on-site inspector and job representative (T. 522, 523). The President of the Corporate Architect was Harold K.
Beecher who wa_s a licensed architect and a member of the American Institute of Architects (T. 534).
Both Harold K. Beecher and Johnathan H. Tucker
on behalf of the corporate architect had considerable
experience with the excavation of deep banks (T.
962; Pl Ex. 52 Tucker's 1st Deposition-pages 5, 10.
14). At the time of trial Mr. Tucker was living in
California and because of his absence both of his
depositions were admitted into evidence as if Mr.
Tucker had been present and had testified (T. 601,
1117; PL Ex. 52, 53). Mr. Harry F. Butcher was the
project representative for Salt Lake City and Salt
Lake County. during the course of construction (T.
525). Mr. Butcher's duties included the job of inspecting to see if things were done according to
the plans and specifications called for (T. 538). Wally Chrfstiansen, the Vice-President of Christiansen
Brothers Construction, Inc., was the project manager
on the Metropolitan Hall of Justice project in charge
of the entire project for the general contractor (T.
770, 772).
The excavation for the east-west utility tunnel
began approximately the first part of September,
1963, and proceeded westerly across 2nd East over
to the old City-County Building (T. 538, 539; Pl Ex.
53 p. 13). The trench was approximately 20 to 23
feet deep as it proceeded west of 2nd East (T. 541,
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666) As the excavation and tunnel work proceeded,
Mr. Harry f. Butcher representing the City Engineer's office and Mr. Johnathan Tucker the qualified
represenL3tive and on-site inspector for the corporate architect occupied a joint office and worked
closely together (T. 536; Pl Ex. 53 p. 9). Both Mr.
Butcher and Mr. Tucker saw the utility tunnel trench
on mary occasions both prior to and after the accident (T. 542; Pl Ex. l 5, 20). Mr. Tucker on behalf of
the arch~tect prepared written daily reports which
he submit1ed to Harold K. Beecher on behalf of the
corporate architect (T. 524, Pl Ex. 8). Mr. Tucker and
Mr. Beecher, both representatives of the architect,
had almost daily contact and conversations regarding the progress of the work (T. 524). During the
progress of construction Mr. Harold Beecher, who
admittedly had considerable experience in excavating deep banks, visited the construction site several
times a week, every week (T. 534, 962).
Mr. Tucker testified that he observed the excavstion of the trench as it progressed every day and
that a safety line for the normal slope of the trench
for safety purposes was never established (Pl £x. 52,
p. 20). The trench was nearly perpendicular except
for about 3 feet at the top (Pl Ex. 25, P. 20). The
standard safety slope for trench excavations, according to Mr. Tucker as well as the provisions contained in Section 69 of the Utah General Safety Or'
ders applicable to trenches on that project, should
be one-foot back on each side for every two feet
of depth rp1 Ex. 52, p. 13; Pl Ex. 25, Pl Ex. 51). Mr.
Tucker testified that he complained to Wally Chris-
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c
tiansen nearly every day concerning the condition
of the walls of the excavation in the utility tunnel
trench due to the lack of slope or shoring (Pl Ex. 53
p. 22, 27). \/\Tally Christiansen told Tucker it would
cost too much money to haul dirt away and then
have to back-fill afterwards if they sloped, therefore,
he wanted to keep the trench to a minimum (Pl Ex.
52, p. 24, 67; Pl Sx. 53 P. 40).
In the middle of September of 1963, Mr. Casper
Nelson, a member of the Utah Industrial Commission, whc wr:i.s directly in charge of the safety division, sent Mr. John Holmes, a state safety inspector,
down to inspect the entire project because of complaints he had received from one of the inspectors
on the job (T. 624, 625, 626). On September 16, 1963,
Mr. John Holmes arrived on the project and observed the east-west utility excavation area to be
d::i.ngerous in that the walls were vertical and were
not supported bv any shoring (T. 612, 615). The area
of the trench where he observed these unsafe conditions was approximately along the sidewalk on
the west side of Second East (T. 613). Mr. Holmes
at that time talked to the foreman of Christiansen
and ordered them to begin shoring the ground and
to live up to state regulations (T. 613). At trial when
asked if he had ever seen the shoring that he had
ordered them to install, Mr. Holmes testified "I didn't
see it completed." (T. 614). Holmes again inspected
the tunnel area on September 18, 1963, but Christiansen Brother's men were not working at that
time (T. 617). Holmes again inspected the trench
area on October 4, 1963, but no work was going on
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in the wGst end cf the trench (T. 619). Mr. Casper
Nelson t2stified that in the latter part of September
after Mr. Holmes had made his first few visits he
personally inspected the trench area and observed
no shoring at all in the trench (T. 626, 627, 635).
On September 25, 1963, a meeting was held on
the proiect involving the subject of general s:i.fetv
rm +he job. Mr. Beecher and Mr. Tucker both emplovees of the c0rporate architect were present as
well as men representing the contractor and the city
(T. 554, 5S.5). All of those present with the exception
of the ge::1erril contractor's representative indicated
that things were not being done correctly (T. 557).
Rolf Christiansen in that meeting told Beecher to
leave him abne and he would build the job IT. 557).
That same day a letter was sent to Christiansen
Bros., In~. from Harold K. Beecher on behalf of the
corporate architect notifying the contractor that it
h"'d not corrmlied with the requirements of the specification~ for the Public Safety and Jail Building to
safeguard life and property and urginq the contractor to correct all unsafe conditions (Pl Ex. 52 P.
46. 47 and exhibit 8 attached thereto).
Thereafter on September 27, 1963, Christiansen
Brothers Incorporated forwarded a written letter to
the comorate architect acknowledging receint of the
letter dated September 25, 1963, and denying that
there existed any abnormal hazardous condition on
the proiect and asking for more specific information
as to where the alleged violations existed (Pl Ex. 52
-exhibit No. 4 attached thereto). Thereafter on Sep-
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temebr 30, 1963, Johnathan Tucker on behalf of the
architect and Harry Butcher, the project engineer.
sent a letter to Christiansen Brothers indicating that
the excavated area for the east-west utility tunnel
required additional safety measures to comply with
the City, County, and State requirements (T. 552; Pl
Ex. 10).
According to Johnathan H. Tucker, work stopped
in that area for about two weeks because Christiansen Brothers, Inc. wanted to stop there until spring,
but work was resumed thereafter since Beecher
wanted +he contractor to continue to the end before
winter. (Pl Ex. 53 p. 30). Mr. Tucker indicated that during the time the job was stopped there were cavems in the trench which could have buried men if
they had been working in the trench (Pl Ex. 53 p.
52). According to the Architect's daily inspection
reports on October 2, 1963, Mr. Joe Ruben, an employee of the architect, took pictures of the bank
cave-ins, one of which was at the west section of the
utility tunnel near the old City Hall (Pl Ex. 8, 34).
Mr. Tucker's inspection daily report sheet for October 10, 1963, indicated that clean-up work was
performed at the tunnel (Pl Ex. 8). The October 10.
1963, daily report sheet prepared by Wally Christiansen indicates that on that date the contractor
had a dragline on the east-west utility tunnel project and was hauling clay away and cleaning out the
tunnel that caved in when rain and flood came (Pl
Ex:. 37). According to the daily report sheets prepcred by Mr. Tucker, the architect's representative.
excavation work was performed in the east-west
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tunnel area on October 11, 1963, and October 15,
1963 (Pl Ex. 8). The daily report dated October 15,
1963, indicated that Harold K. Beecher visited the
job on that date and made an inspection of the excavations w~th Mr. Butcher (Pl Ex. 8).
On October 16, 1963, Art Nauman, the respondent. was brought on the project for the first time for
the purpose of finishing the construction of the tunnel that had been started west of the Second East
Road (T. 652). 'Tucker testified that despite complaints made to Wally by him regarding failure to
comply with safety regulations, the trench on October 16, 1963, was still in an unsafe condition since
Wally had no shoring west of the end of the tunnel
(Pl Ex. 52 p. 50). Mr. Nauman had only worked on
two trench excavations prior to that which were
only 6 or 7 feet in depth (T. 691). Nauman in his experience as a carpenter had never worked in such
a confined area, with the depth and water which
the utility tunnel excavation had (T. 665). Nauman
had likewise never supervised or done any labor
on shoring the walls of an excavation; he had only
done some shoring against concrete forms (T. 666).
The trench in that area on October 16, 1963, was
full of water and mud requiring Mr. Nauman to
spend much of the day pumping water out (Pl Ex. 53
p. 58). That morning Mr. Nauman met with Wally
Christiansen the project manager who told him that
he had received some complaints about sloping
from the inspectors which were overly exaggerated
(T. 679). I.JI/ally told Art Nauman that the sloping was
sufficient, that he couldn't afford to slope it any
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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more than ii: was already and he would have to rely
on shoring (T. 679). Wally further told Mr. Nauman
that he couldn't taper in the area of the trench where
the light pole existed, since the city wouldn't let
therri remove it (T. 654). At trial Harry Butcher denied
the fact that Wally had asked him, or Roy Mcleese,
the city engineer, or VVoody Walton, or Joe Fenton,
city employees, for permission to remove the light
pole (T. 592). Pe stated if they wanted to remove it
all they had to do was pay for it (T. 592). John Tucker testified he had requested Wally to remove the
light pole, but Wally refused because he didn't
want to hire any electricians (Pl Ex. 53 P. 59). According to Tucker it was Wally's responsibility (Pl
Ex. 53, p. 59). Thereafter Wally took Mr. Nauman
to find a sevrer leak so it could be repaired. (T. 657).
Wally also introduced Nauman to the clam shovel
operator who was told to help Nauman in regard to
the sewer line leak and to prepare the excavation
in the trench for gravel which had been ordered for
that morning (T. 167). The gravel, which y;.:::..s not
ordered by Mr. Nauman, arrived about 10:00 that
morning and was to be used as a leveling base for
the rough floor under the tunnel (T. 659. 660). As
:tvfr. Nauman was being shown the job by \"!ally
Christiansen, he noticed two laborers who were
working in the trench (T. 657). One of the laborers
was working behind the forms that extended from
the poured portion of the tunnel (T. 657). Mr. Nauman spent the rest of the day pumping water out
of the excavation, leveling the gravel, finding and
exposing the sewer line leak, and putting up barricades around the job (T. 660, 661 ).
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That on the morning of October 17, 1963, when
Mr. Nauman arrived on the job and went to the excavation there were four laborers already in the
trench (T. 696). Mr. Nauman had set up his surveyors
level approximately 8 feet from the end of the exi3ting tunnel and was taking grade shots when the
cave-in occurred just 30 or 45 minutes after he had
arrived at the excavation (T. 663, 664). At trial the
Defendant, throngh counsel, stipulated that Mr. Nauman received serious, permanent injuries as a resul t of the above accident (T. 649). Mr. Nauman's
neck wa~ broken rendering him qtiadriplegic.
Both Johnathan Tucker, representing the architect, and Harry Butcher were present near the scene
of the cave-in on the morning of October 17, 1963,
just minutes prior to the tragedy (T. 561; Pl Ex. p. 67).
Butcher testified that he saw 3everal men in the
trench spreading gravel with hand shovels (T. 562).
When asked if he observed the walls at that time,
Butcher testified that the walls were like they alwe._ys wore, straight up and down, except at the top
where it was sloped a little IT. 563). Butcher testified
that he noticed a bulge on the south bank approximately eight to ten feet from the end of the tunnel
(T. 563). When asked if he and Tucker discussed anything about the bulge, he stated, no (T. 568). Tucker
testified that just minutes prior to the cave-in he inspected the area and observed some loose dirt up
under the base of the light pole (Pl Ex. 53 p. 59). It
is important +o note that Joe Ruben made the remark
to Tucker that he did not consider the conditions
around the light pole safe (Pl Ex. 53 p. 62). Tucker
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stated that he agreed with Ruben that it was not
safe and should be removed (Pl Ex. 53 p. 62). Tucker
stated that he and Butcher had just turned to go
back to the field office to hunt for Wally to complain
about ths- light pole when they were told "A man
has been b1Jried." (Pl Ex.· 53 p. 63). Tucker testified
that when he went back to the scene of the cave-in
he observed that the loose earth that was up by the
light pole was down in the hole (Pl Ex. 53 p. 65).
Both Mr. Tucker and Mr. Beecher on behalf of
the corporate architect at least five times went together and complained to Wally Christiansen relative to the hazardous condition of the excavation in
the east-west tunnel area (Pl Ex. 52 p. 34). Tucker
testified that he never received any order from Mr.
Beecher or any other employee of the architect telling him to stop the work until the hazardous conditions were corrected (Pl Ex. 52 p. 36). Tucker stated
that if any stop-work orders were issued prior to
the cave-in, ithat the daily reports would reflect it
(pl Ex. 52 p. 36). None of the daily reports indicate
any such order.
At trial, Nauman testified that the excavation
was approximately 15 feet wide at the base, 21 feet
deep, and 20 feet wide at the top (T. 665, 666). At
Tucker's first deposition, he identified a picture taken Yz hour after the cave-in of the trench where
Nauman was injured which fairly well represented
the contours of the trench and the conditions that
existed on the morning of October 17, 1963, (Pl Ex.
52 p. 44; and attached exhibit No. 6). A copy of this
same . picture is attached to the last page of this

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15

brief. Joe L. Ulibarri, an eye witness to the cave-in,
who was just ten feet away at the time it occurred
testified that the walls were straight up and down
on the south side (T. 535). Casper Nelson, the Industrial Commissioner, testified he went down on the
project that day after being informed a man had
been inj'...lred (T. 629). Mr. Nelson, when asked to
describe the general conditions, testified that the
walls were real V8rticle, rather than irregular, and
that he found no horizontal supports across the exC'='Vation west of the end of the utility tunnel (T. 680,
681).
ANSWER TO POINT ONE
THE RECORD lS FULL OF COMPETENT EVIDENCE
FROM WHICH THE TRIER OF FACT COULD FIND
THE ARCHITECT WAS NEGLIGENT.

The Appellant erroneously contends that this
is one of those rare causes of action in which liability can only be predicated upon expert testimony
of other architects. Such an argument totally ignores
the fact that there was competent testimony of other
architects as well as Appellant's own on-site inspector, plus the stafe safety inspectors, upon which the
Court could find the Appellant was negligent. Furthermore, none of the authorities cited by Appellant
involve the architects liability based on its supervisory undertaking. Instead, they all relate to an
architectE: liability based upon defects in plans or
specifications which obviously would require some
expert t8stimony from an architect. In this case,
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however, recovery is based upon the failure of the
architect who had undertaken for a price to superv]se job performance, to see that work was done
s:i.fely. Under this theory, questions involving safety
and notice thereof in construction were not matters
which architects were the only ones competent to
testify on.
The Court, in Paxton v. Alameda County, 259
P. 2d 934 (Ca. App. 1953), recognized this distinction between an architect's liability based upon defects in plans and specifications and the architect's
liability in its s11pervisory capacity. In that case suit
was brought against both the County which was
constructing the building, and the architect. The
only allegation of negligence against the architsct
involved his negligence in preparing the plans and
specifications. The Trial Court found for the Pla]ntiff
against both defendants. On appeal, the Court after
weighing the expert testimony held that the evidence did not sustain the verdict of the jury that the
architect was negligent in preparing the plans and
specifications but found against the County under
the theory that the County was liable because of
the negligent supervision of its agent, the architect.
The Court made it quite clear that had the Plaintiff
added a count against the architect based upon its
negligent supervision the jury could have found
the architect was negligent for not making another
inspection.
The Appellc.nt agreed with the public bodies to
furnish at its own expense a "qualified" on-site inspector during the entire time the construction work
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was in progress to supervise and inspect all phases
of the work being done Pl Ex. 1). Johnathan H.
Tucker was this "qualified on-site inspector" employed by the architect. Mr. Tucker's work record
indicates that he had been general superintendent
for several large construction companies and had
been in full charge of heavy construction for a number of years. That experience included being in
charge of several excavations. The testimony contained in Mr. Tucker's two depositions, both of
which were admitted into evidence, standing alone
is suffident, competent evidence from which the
trier of hct could conclude the architect was negligent. In support thereof we refer the Court to the
numerous references to Tucker's testimony contained in Respondent's Statement of Facts, which
clearly establishes that a dangerous condition did
exist, that the architect knew of this condition, and
that the architect took no steps to correct the danger.
Tucker's testimony indicates that he as the architect's on-site inspector and job representative
watched the excavation of the trench as it progressed every day. According to Tucker, Joe Ruben,
who was an architect as well as an employee of the
Appellant, admitted to him prior to the cave-in that
the area around the light post didn't look safe (Pl
Ex. 53 p. 62). Tucker also testified that despite the
fact he had requested Wally to remove it, Wally
refused because he would have to hire electricians
(Pl Ex. 53 p. 59). In addition to the above, Tucker
identified the picture marked exhibit P-6 as one accurately representing the conditions that existed in
the trench at the time the cave-in occured. (Pl Ex. 52,
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p. 45 picture No. 6 attached thereto). That picture (a
copy of which is attached to the last page of this
brief) clearly indicates that the trench was not sloped
nor shored in the area where the cave-in occurred.
Casper Nelson, the Industrial Commissioner in
charge of the safety division viewed the accident
scene the day of the cave-in and testified that the
walls appeared real vertical and were without shoring west of the tunnel. Mr. Nelson, who was also a
member of the American Society of Safety Engineers, further indicated that the Utah General Safety Orders for Utah Industries other than mining as
well as 1he American Standard Safety Code for
Building Construction were State Safety Codes applicable +.o that project. According to Mr. Nelson,
the Americc.n Standard Safety Code is recognized
as the Bible for safety standards in the building industry. Both of the above safety codes were expressly made a. part of the constructon contract, and both
required either sloping or shoring (Pl Ex. 2 paragraph
lb special conditions; Pl Ex. 25, 26, 50).

It is important to note the American Standard
Safety Code for Building Construction represents a
consensus of a number of combined interests groups
as to the present thinking in the field of safety. The
American Institute of Architects, the American Society of Civil Engineers, the National Safety Council, and the Associated General Contractors of
America are but a few of the organizations that
sponsored this particular safety code. The minimum
requirements pertaining to excavation and trenches
contained in that code provided illustrative evi-
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dence cf safety practices or rules generally prevailing in the industry. Failure to comply with these
generally recognized safe practices in the industry
was competent evidence for the finder of fact to
weigh with other factors in determining _the issue
of negligence.
Harry Butcher, the project engineer who also
inspected the job along with Tucker, testified that
he was in the area with Tucker when the cave-in
occurred just minutes before and noticed that the
walls were straight up and down (T. 563). Joe L. Ulibarri an employee of the contractor who was working just ten feet from the area when the cave-in occurred likewise testified that the walls were straight
up and down (T. 535). Edwin M. Schneider, another
employee of the general contractor, testified that
just minutes after the cave-in, he went to the scene
and observed no shoring west of the end of the
tunnel (T. 605). In addition to that, Mr. Evan Ashby,
the dragline operator who helped in rescue efforts
testified that he was· ordered to place his- dragline
bucket in such a position so that if there were any
additional cave-ins, the bucket would take their t_mpact. IT. 884).
Harold K. Beecher's testimony indicated that
Wally Christiansen, the contractor's man in charge,
had not been cooperative with respect to the safety on the job (T. 998). We refer the Court to Pl Ex.
47 wherein Mr. Beecher on behalf of the corporate
architect admitted, in writing, a few days after the
cave-in that there had been an extreme laclcof .co-
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operation and belligerent attitude that the contractor, Christiansen Bros. Incorporated had taken from
the beginning of construction to October 17, the
date of the accident at the tunnel cave-in. Mr. Beecher, President of the Appellant, took the position at
trial that the architect's liability in its supervisory
capacity should be limited to a duty to see that the
project was con.structed in accordance with the
plans and specifications and that it should have no
riqhts or responsibilities with regard to safety on the
job (T. 1022, 1023). Mr. Beecher further testified that
he did not think he had authority to stop work if he
saw an unsafe condition on the job (T. 1021). In addition to 'that, the Appellant in its answer to Plaintiff's
second ~"mended complaint expressly denied it undertook to enforce the safety regulations and procedures for the protection of workmen on that proj. ect (T. 221 p. 4).
One need only review the record to see that
the Appellant's entire defense at trial was made up
of interested witnesses, in the form of architects, who
did not fee] that they should be responsible for
safety. Of the four architects who testified for the
Appellant, two were employees of that corporntion
at the time of the cave-in, and the other two were
members of the American Institute of Architects who
had never seen the trench, except from pictures. All
Eour based their conclusion that the trench was safe
on the erroneous assumption that the trench was
properly sloped in compliance with the Utah Industrial Commission Safety Orders. It is basic law
that the testimony of such experts is worth no more
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than the reasons they give. In the instant case the
weight of the evidence established that the walls
were vertical and not sloped nor shored. The trial
court was not bound to accept the second-hand unsupported opinions of those architects who had
never seen the trench, except by photographs, and
reject the direct testimony of those witnesses who
were present and personally observed the conditions
for themselves as they existed on that project.
There was plenty of competent evidence in the
form of testimony, photographs, daily reports, letters, and safety codes from which the trial court
might clearly find defendant was negligent in foiling to see that the work was carried on in a safe
manner.
ANSWER TO POINT TWO
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH
THE FINDER OF FACTS COULD REASONABLY CONCLUDE NAU!\-1AN WAS NOT GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

The burden of pleading and proving contributory negligence is upon the defendant and if the
evidence is such as to permit reasonable minds to
differ as t2 whether a person is guilty of contributory
negligence the question is one for the finder of fact.
The Court in Hindmarsh v. 0. P. ·Skaggs Foodliner,
21 Utah 2d 413, 446 P. 2d 410 (1968) referred to the
above principles of judicial review when faced with
the question whether the Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. In that case
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the court further indicated that there must be allowed considerable latitude in which the reasoning
of the fact finder can operate and draw its conclusion even though those conclusions may be different from that which the Court on appeal would
hc..ve decided. The Appellant, in contending that if
the excavation was dangerous then Nauman was
contributory negligent as a matter of law, literally
ignores such important evidenciary factors as
whether or not Mr. Nauman knew or should have
known of the danger, his experience, the fact he
had only worked in the trench a portion of one day,
and whether or not Mr. Nauman was warned by
anyone of the dangerous conditions that existed.
The mere naked finding that a dangerous condition exists does not constitute sufficient evidence
to establish contributory negligence without first
showing that an ordinary reasonable person knew
or should have known of the danger. See Baker vs.
Decker. 117 Utah 15, 212 P. 2d 679 (1949) vvr_ere the
Court indicated that mere knowledge that a walk
was in a dangerous condition did not constitute evidence to establish contributory negilgence. The
Court in Rogalski vs. Phillips Petroleum Co.. 3 Utah
2d 203, 282 P. 2d 304 (1955) similarly indicated that
one couid not be held guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law, i£ it appeared that he
had no knowledge of the danger. It is important to
note that Mr. Nauman when injured was engaged
in carrying 0ut the orders of Wally Christiansen, the
project manager. The records show that Mr. Nauman had only worked on two jobs which had trench
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excavations prior to the cave-in (T. 691). Nauman
further testified that in his experience as a carpenter.
he had never worked in such confined areas and he
further noted that he likewise had never supervised
or done any labor or shoring on the walls of an excavation (T. 665, 666). Nauman was told by Wally
Christiansen the first morning at work that the complaints about sloping from the inspectors were overly exaggerated (T. 679). Nauman was told that the
sloping as it existed was sufficient and that the contractor couldn't afford to slope it anymore than it
already had been (T. 679). The evidence further indicates that Mr. Nauman during his short exposure
to the project was required to carry out several different errands for the contractor and obviously was
not able to concentrate all his time without distraction on the conditions existing in the trench. Nauman spent much of his time finding and exposing
a sewer line leak, pumping water out of the excavation, leveling gravel, and putting up barricades (T.
660, 661). According to Nauman's undisputed testimony, he thought the excavation was safe for the
type of work .he was doing at the time (T. 696).
The Appellant's contention that Mr. Nauman
knew this portion of the work had been shut down _
because of unsafe conditions and was specifically
directed to be careful and safe is not supported by
the evidence. The architect's on-site inspector,
Johnathan Tucksr, co u 1 d not remember of
:my stop-work orders being issued because of safety on tha~ project. (Pl Ex. 52, p. 36). He indicated
that if any said stop-work orders had been issued,
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the daily reports would indicate so. The daily reports are absent any indication of a stop-work order.
Accordinq to the testimony at trial, Nauman was
unaware that a portion of the work had been shut
down because the previous foreman had not safely directed the work (T. 673, 703, 705). All Mr. Nauman understood at the time was that there had been
a lapse of time in regard to the work done on the
utility tunnel trench.
Wally Christiansen when asked at trial if he
said anything to Mr. Nauman about safety or safety precautions on the job stated in substance and
effect that he couldn't remember exactly whether
he did or didn't (T. 801). Christiansen also testified
that he ci:mldn't recall whether he or Nauman discussed the subject of shoring when he went into
the excavation on October 16, 1963 (T. 803).
The Defendant has without question failed in its
burden of proof to show that the defects were of
such an obviously da.ngerous character that Mr.
Nauman under the circumstances was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law. We find it difficult to
see how the appellant on the one hand can argue
that it as well as the general contractor, and all the
appellant's witnesses, with all their combined expertise, considered the trench to be safe and on the
other hand change hats and contend the unwarned,
unexperienced man who had only worked in that
trench for a portion of one day knew or should have
known. The evidence is clear that when Nauman
was injured, he was engaged in carrying out the
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orders of his supervisor, Wally Christiansen. When
you combine 1) +he fact that Mr. Nauman had relatively no experience in excavation work; with 2)
Nauman's short period of exposure to this job; with,
3) the fad that Mr. Nauman was not warned of the
dangers including the fact that continual complaints
had been made about safety on that particular excavation, together; with, 4) the fact that there had been
prior cave-ins large enough that men could have be
been buried. it becomes clear that there was sufficient evidence from which reasonable minds might
conclude tha.1- Mr. Nauman was not guilty of contributory negligence. The defendant, who had the burden on this issue contributed nothing by way of
proof to take the issue of contributory negligence
out of the realm of fact, for determination as a matter of law.
ANSWER TO POINT THREE
THIS COURT IN THE PREVIOUS APPEAL HAS ALREADY RULED THAT PLAINTIFPS ACTION WAS
NOT BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANN. 35-1-42 (1953 AS AMENDED).

The Appellant unsuccessfully devoted a total
of 8 pages in its brief on the first appeal of this case
to the argument that Mr. Nauman's exclusive remedy
was workman's compensation. The case of Cook v.
Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 15 Utah 2d 20, 386 P. 2d 616
(1963), was relied upon heavily in that appeal just
as it is being argued here. We are not aware of any
change in the law regarding workman's compensa-
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tion which requires a different decision on this appeal. We submit that the prior decision, in which
the Court held that Plaintiff's complaint stated a
cause of action against the architect, should be binding here. Nauman v. Beecher 19 Utah 2d 101, 426
P. 2d 621 (1967).
Ort page 26 of Appellant's Brief it is argued that
under Utah Code Ann. S. 35-1-42, (1953 as amended)
that the right to superivse and control is the only
element necessary in order to establish an employment situation. Vve disagree. The right to supervise
and control, although important factors in.determining whether or not an employment situation exists,
must necessarily have combined with its a showing
that "such work is . a part or process in the trade or
business of the employer". The relevant section of
the above statute referred to by Appellant together
with that part of the statute which Appellant fails
to consider reads as follows:
.

". . . Where any employer procures any work
t,o be done-wholly or in part for him by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision
or control, and such work is a part or process
in the trade· or bu~iness of the employer, such
contractor, and all subcontractors under him,
and all persons employed by any such subcontractors, shall be deemed within the meaning of
this section, employees of such original employer. Any person, firm or corporation engaged
in the performance of work as an independent
contractor shall be deemed an employer within the meaning of this section. The term "independent contractor," as herein used, is
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defined to be any person, association or corpom ti on engaged in the performance of any
work for another, who, while so engaged, is independent of the employer in all that pertains
to the execution of the work, is not subject to
the rule or control of the employer, is engaged
only in the performance of a definite job or
piece of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in accordance
with the employer's design."

This question has been considered by the Utah
Supreme Court on several occasions. In Anderson
v. Last Chance Ranch Company. 63 Utah 551, 228 P.
184, the Court made it quite clear that the general
business of the employer was a controlling factor
in determining the nature of employment and the
right to compensation. In that case the Court denied
workman's compensation to a carpenter's helper
who had been employed by the ranch company to
build a house on the ranch. The reason given was
that the ranch company was engaged in the farming business not construction which was merely incidental to said business. In Murray v. Wasatch
Grading Company. 73 Utah 430, 274 P. 940 (1929),
the Court again looked to the general business of the
employer. Plaintiff in that case an employee of
the railroad company but was injured while helping the defendant contractor whose job it was to
clear debris from the railroad tracks. On appeal the
Plaintiffs third party action against the contractor
was denied. The Court on review, looked to a
statute almost identical to 35-1-42 and found that
since the Plaintiff was doing work for the contractor,
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which work was the business occupation of the contractor, the Plaintiff was therefore an employee of
the contractor, despite the fact he was also an employer :of the railroad company. The case of Cook v.
Peter Kiewit Sons Co., supra, (1957), although not
specifically addressing itself to 35-1-42 does indicate
and recognize that lhe work being performed by
the employee must be a part or process in the trade
or business of the employer. In that case both the
Pla~ntiff's employer and the Defendant agreed to
unite their efforts to complete a tunnel by sharing
profits and losses. Both were regarded as one employing unit and the employees of both companies
were treated as engaged in the same employment.
The Court based its reasonings on the fact that 1)
the Defendant had as much control over Plaintiff
as he did his own immediate employees and because 2) the work which was being performed by
the Plaintiff was for the joint venture which work
included the trade or business of the joint venture.
The case of Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 139,
442 P. 2d 31 (1968), presents the most recent consideration of the statute by the Utah Supreme Court.
In that case the defendant truck owner wholly
agreed to furnish the truck including the driver to
Gibbons & Reed Company in connection with Gibbons & Reed's contract to lower the grade of the
street. The expenses in connection with the use of
the truck were borne by the Defendant truck owner
who was paid hourly by Gibbons & Reed for the
use of the truck. During the course of the job, the
Pla.intiff, an employee of Gibbons & Reed Company,
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was injured by the defendant. The Court, in declaring defendant was an employee of Gibbons & Reed,
gave the following reasons which are certainly
appropos here:
"In the instant case, Gibbons & Reed had full .
control of defendants truck and directed the
driver, whether it .was Stringham or his employee. The work done by the Defendant and
his truck was the very work being performed
by Gibbons & Reed Company pursuant to its
contract with Ogden City."

It is obvious from the above decisions as well
as from the express language contained in 35-1-42,
that the mere right to supervise and control without
first establishing that the work done is a part or
process in the trade or business of the emproyer
is not enough to bring one's work within the purview
of the workman's compensation act. In the instant
case the public bodies procured worked to be done
for it by Christiansen Bros., an independant contractor. Since the work of Christiansen Bros. involved
the business of construction and was not part or
process in the trade or business of the public bodies,
the language regarding same employment found in
Section 35-1-42 is not applicable. The case of Cook
v. Peter Kiewitt Sons Co., supra, which Appellant
relies he~vily on can easily be distinguished. In
that case, the Plaintiff's employer and the defendant
were engaged in a joint venture, they were sharing profits and losses, the employees of both employers were under the control of both employers,
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and the work being performed by both the Plaintiff's employer and defendant as well as their emplovees was work which included the trade or business of the joint venture. In the instant case, however, the architect and Christiansen's Bros. were not
engaged i.n a joint venture, they were not sharing
profits and losses, the work done by the general
contractor was not a part or process in the trade or
business of ether the public bodies or the architect,
and last but not least the element of control is lacking since the architect had no right to interfere with
the contractor's execution of the work providing it
was being carried on in a safe manner. See Nauman
v. Harold K. Beecher & Associates, supra (1967).
ANSWER TO POINT FOUR
SINCE REASONABLE MINDS COULD HONESTLY
CONCLUDE THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCI,USIONS OF LAW ARE SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE, THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT
SHOULD BE SUSTAINED.

The Court in DeVas v. Nobel. 13 Utah 2d 133,
369 P. 2d 290 (1962), in addressing itself to the question whether the Trial Court was obliged to make
the finding demanded by the defendants, set £orth
the following principles of review which should be
applied:
" . . . In order to compel such a finding it is
necessary that the evidence concerning the fact
in question be of sufficient quality and substance to support a finding that it is true, but
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it must go beyond that and be such that all
reasonable minds would so conclude."

Appellant's contention that findings No. 13, 15,
16, and 18, were not supported by the evidence is
without merit. In support thereof we .incorporate, by
reference, the evidence referred to in Respondent's
Statement of Facts, as well as the Answers to Appellant's first three points. Since the evidence concerning the facts as presented by Appellant was
not of such "sufficient quality and substance that"
all reasonable minds would so conclude", the ruling of the Trial Court should be sustained.
CONCLUSION
The evidence, taken in its entirety, leads solely
to the conclusion that Appellant undertook for a
price to inspect and supervise all phases of the work
being done. An aspect of that undertaking involved
the safety of persons upon the construction site. The
architect's specifications and contracts included
safety. For more than two weeks prior to the "cavein" the Architect had knowledge that the trench was
unsafe due to water problems, prior large cave-ins,
and due to the failure of the contractor to slope or
shore. Under these circumstances a duty de_volved
upon the architect to stop work on the project until
the contractor had properly sloped or shored in such
a manner as to make the excavation a safe place to
work. See Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher and Associates. supEt; Erhart v. Hammonds, 232 Ark.133, 134
S.\i\T.2d 869; Miller v. De Witt, 59 Ill. App.2d 38; 208
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N.E.2d 249; Miller v. DeWitt, (Ill. Sup. Ct.); Paxton v.
Alameda County, supra.
The ad terrorem appeal by amicus curiae that
utter chaos in the construction industry will result
if architects are held to the standard of due care is
fanciful. Ii the architects will perform their function
with due care, as must everyone else under our law,
there will be less accident liability. We reject the
faulted logic of amicus that the entire architectural
industry is on trial here. It might not be an overstatement to suggest, however, that the modi
operandi of some of its practitioners are.
Respectfully submitted

DONN E. CASSITY
EUGENE H. DAVIS
FORD G. SCALLEY
Attorneys for Respondent
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